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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
doctrine, that land being put to a public use for which the present
owner has been granted the power of eminent domain should not be
usurped by another condemning authority, is furthered by the supreme
court's new criteria; however, the criteria also serve the important
function of limiting the doctrine's shield to those lands that are in
actual use and necessary to the success of the public purpose for which
the legislature granted the power of eminent domain.
CRAIG B. WILLIS
Environmental Law-NEPA-REGONAL IMPACT STATEMENT Is NOT
REQUIRED IN THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR REGIONAL
AcTIVITY-Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
Kleppe v. Sierra Club' concerned the applicability of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)2 to cumulative federal action in
an area encompassing portions of four states: Wyoming, Montana,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. Identified in the original complaint
as the Northern Great Plains Region, the area contains an extremely
rich basin of low sulfur coal.3 The coal is easily accessible through
strip mining. Recent energy demands make development of coal re-
serves a matter of vital public concern, but development of the Region's
coal would have an extensive environmental impact.'
NEPA establishes a federal policy to maintain and restore the en-
vironment through all practicable means. 5 The act requires that en-
vironmental impact be a major factor in all federal agency decision-
making; each agency report or recommendation on a proposed major
federal action must include an environmental impact statement de-
tailing the proposed action's impact, its effect on long-term productivity,
and the extent to which resources will be irreversibly committed. The
impact statement must also describe any unavoidable adverse effects
and possible alternatives to the proposed action.6
1. 427 U.S. 390 (1976), rev'g Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1970).
3. The Northern Great Plains Region holds more than 48% of the nation's total
coal reserve. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
4. 514 F.2d at 862.
5. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970) states:
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable
means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
6. NEPA § 102(2)(C)(v), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC)(v)
-
(1970).
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Federal agency activity was essential to the exploitation of the
Northern Great Plains coal reserve. Eighty-five percent of the region
was under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, who had
already issued several mining leases for the region. Access to much of
the region fell within the control of the Department of Agriculture
and the United States Army.7 It was not disputed that the individual
leases and rights-of-way issued for the region required the preparation
of impact statements, and four such separate statements had been
prepared. In addition, the Department of Interior had prepared an
impact statement covering its entire national coal leasing program. 8
But Sierra Club contended that the coal mining activity within the
Northern Great Plains area required a regional impact statement as
well.
In 1973 Sierra Club brought suit against the Departments of In-
terior, Agriculture, and the Army in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. Declaratory and injunctive relief was
sought.9 The district court granted summary judgment for the
agencies, and Sierra Club appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Before ruling on the
merits, the court of appeals issued a preliminary injunction against
the approval of four mining leases in those areas for which separate
impact statements had already been prepared.'0 After a hearing on the
merits, the appellate court reversed the district court and outlined a
four-part test for determining when judicial intervention to require
preparation of regional impact statements was appropriate. The test
required consideration of: (1) the likelihood that a program would be
implemented and the proximity of such implementation; (2) the
present availability of the information needed to determine the effects
of implementation and the existence of alternatives; (3) the extent
to which development of the program had already caused irretrievable
commitments of resources and precluded options; and (4) the severity
of environmental effects if the program were implemented." Al-
7. The Department of Agriculture controls issuance of rights-of-way through national
forests. The Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction over navigable waters. 514 F.2d
at 864.
8. The national statement was incomplete when Sierra Club filed its original com-
plaint. The final statement was issued in September 1975 and proposed a complex new
leasing program. The new program is now being implemented. 427 U.S. at 398.
9. Id. at 394-95. Several mining companies, public utilities, natural gas companies,
an Indian tribe, and a rancher were allowed to intervene. American Electric Power
System v. Sierra Club, companion case to Kleppe, involved most of the original intervenors.
427 U.S. at 395.
10. Sierra Club v. Morton, 509 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (issuing preliminary in-
junction).
11. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d at 880. This test-was actually first delineated in
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though it found that the first and last of these factors were ripe for
determination, the appellate court felt that consideration of the re-
maining two yielded inconclusive results. As a result, the court con-
tinued its injunction forbidding federal action in the region and
ordered the agencies to report to the district court upon the comple-
tion of a regional study then being conducted. 12 The court of appeals
refused to dissolve its injunction, and the United States Supreme Court
granted both the agencies' motions for a stay of the injunction and
their petition for certiorari. 13
On review of the case, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals. The Court found that NEPA does not require an impact state-
ment unless a proposal for regional development has been formulated.
Absent a proposal for major federal action, the Court felt that any
statement prepared would amount to little more than conjecture re-
garding environmental impact. The Supreme Court considered and
rejected Sierra Club's claim that a regional impact statement was re-
quired because the individual projects in the Northern Great Plains
Region were intimately related. The Court accepted the reasoning
that several projects having a cumulative effect should be treated under
a cumulative impact statement, but, absent a showing of arbitrariness,
agency discretion as to whether a regional statement was necessary
was presumed to be appropriately exercised. The Supreme Court also
rejected the appellate court's premise that at some point during agency
contemplation of a program, a federal court may require that prepara-
tion of an impact statement be initiated. The Court regarded the
District of Columbia Circuit's four-part test as an unauthorized de-
parture from the statutory language of NEPA. Because the statute
makes no mention of balancing factors, the Court reasoned, no such
balancing test is valid. Even if such a test were valid, the Court con-
cluded that an injunction pending consideration of the test's four
Scientists" Institute for Public Information (SIPI) v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). A similar test was suggested in Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31
(2d Cir. 1972).
12. The result of the regional study, the "Northern Great Plains Resources Pro-
gram," would-it was presumed-provide the information necessary for determination
of the likelihood of the project's fruition and the extent of irretrievable commitments.
514 F.2d at 881-82.
13. 423 U.S. 1047 (1976). An amici brief was filed by 22 named states in support of
Sierra Club's position. Joining Sierra Club in its assertion that only programmatic impact
statements made at an early stage can meaningfully affect decisionmaking, the states
also emphasized the importance of programmatic statements as an informational tool for
affected states. ENvr'L L. REP. 65,339 (1976) (Document Service/Pending Litigation).
• :14. NEPA § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
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factors was improper absent any showing of harm or countervailing
equities. 15
Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion in which Justice Brennan
joined.1 While Marshall largely concurred with the majority opinion,
he dissented from the majority's rejection of the appellate court's
four-part balancing test. Marshall felt that in rejecting the test, the
majority restricted courts' ability to adequately effectuate NEPA. In-
junctions issued after agency action has been proposed are insufficient
to ensure early consideration of environmental factors. Marshall con-
cluded that the four-part test was sufficiently narrow to protect federal
agencies from undue interference, while allowing court intervention
to require consideration of environmental factors during the develop-
ment of a proposal.
The Supreme Court's treatment of NEPA in Kleppe reflects a
notable shift from the previously broad construction of the statute.
NEPA itself contains three sections, the second of which bears sig-
nificantly upon the Kleppe decision. 17 Section 102 declares:
[T]o the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall ... [fulfill certain obliga-
tions, including preparation of a detailed impact statement, designed
to make environmental considerations an essential part of agency
decisionmaking]. 5
The act became law on January 1, 1970, under the Senate sponsor-
ship of Henry Jackson and the House sponsorship of John Dingell."9
Neither the original Senate bill nor the House bill included an "action-
15. 427 U.S. at 407-08. The Supreme Court's treatment of the injunction seems
to hinge on the failure of the circuit court to define clearly any inequity which would
result if the injunction were not imposed. Id.. The dissolving of the injunction on
this basis probably has no great precedential value and will not be treated further here.
16. Id. at 415.
17. The first part, Title I, § 101, is a national environmental policy statement. 42
U.S.C. § 4331. Title II establishes the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). 42
U.S.C. § § 4342-4344. See note 49 infra for a description of CEQ's duties and authority.
18. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
19. Senator Jackson chaired the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
and Representative Dingell chaired the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
For a good summary of NEPA's legislative history, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE
CouRTs: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1-14 (1973);
R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITs AFTERMATH 10-35
(1976).
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forcing" provision such as section 102.20 The Senate bill was later
amended, however, to include a provision which required federal
agencies to make findings of environmental impact. This "findings"
provision was eventually replaced in conference committee by the
present section 102.21 The replacement of the general findings require-
ment with the more explicit statement in section 102 reflects an intent
by the bill's drafters to require a more than superficial consideration
of the environment by federal agencies.
22
Another conference committee amendment increased the scope of
section 102. The phrase "to the fullest extent possible," which had
originally modified only "the policies, regulations and public laws of
the United States, ' '2 3 was shifted to become the introductory phrase in
the section. Thus, in the bill's final form, "to the fullest extent possible"
also applied to those actions required of all federal agencies. In effect,
the final form included a broad environmental mandate to be followed
by all federal agencies unless specific authorization indicated other-
wise. The changing of the phrase was interpreted in the Statement of
House Managers, appended to the conference report:
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each
agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives
set out in [section 102 of NEPA] unless the existing law applicable
to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full com-
pliance with one of the directives impossible. Thus, it is the intent
of the conferees that the provision "to the fullest extent possible"
shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding
compliance with the directives set out in section 102. . . . Rather,
the language in section 102 is intended to assure that ... no agency
shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing statu-
tory authorizations to avoid compliance.2 4
20. S. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 3701 (1969); H.R. 12549, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 17983 (1969).
21. This version of the bill, which also recognized that each person has a funda-
mental right to a healthful environment, was passed unanimously in the Senate. 115
CONG. REc. 19008-13 (1969). The latter provision was deleted in conference. STATEMENT
OF THE MANAGERS ON TRE PART OF THE HOUSE, appended to CONGRESS. REP. ON S. 1075,
H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Dec. 1969), reprinted in [19691 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2767, 2768-69 [hereinafter STATEMENT OF HOUSE MANAGERS].
22. The Senators apparently changed their position on the bill in the interim between
Senate passage and conference committee consideration. This was probably a compromise
with Senator Muskie. At least one source believes that the compromise was necessitated
by a basic conflict between the Jackson view that the agencies should integrate environ-
mental considerations into their procedures autonomously and the Muskie view that
some external force would be necessary to make the agencies incorporate environmental
concerns. R. LIROFF, supra note 19, at 18-20 (1976).
23. STATEMENT OF HOUSE MANAGERS, supra note 21, at 2769-70.
24. Id. at 2770. The amendment was originally presented as a compromise. Congress-
pVl. 5
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Once the modified bill was returned to the House and Senate
floors, it was passed with brief debate and little opposition. No enforce-
ment provision was included in the statute.25 In early NEPA cases, the
courts took an active role in enforcing NEPA.2' The Supreme Court's
use of an arbitrariness standard of review in Kleppe, however, may
signal a more restricted judicial role in the future.
The standard of judicial review to be applied in NEPA cases was
an early subject for court consideration. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 27 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit used the reported views of the Senate
and House conferees in its review of AEC procedures for consideration
of environmental impact-ss The phrase "to the fullest extent possible"
was deemed by the court to set a high procedural standard, in contrast
to the more flexible phrase "use of all practicable means consistent
with other essential considerations" found in section 101 of NEPA.29
Citing the Statement of House Managers, the court ruled that section
102 mandates full compliance with its directives unless such compliance
is expressly prohibited by a pre-existing statute.s0 Such a clear pro-
cedural requirement, the court stated, created judicially enforceable
rights. While an agency decision under section 101 may only be re-
viewable under an arbitrariness standard, "if the decision [under sec-
tion 102] was reached procedurally without individualized considera-
tion and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in
good faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.''31
Thus, the District of Columbia court regarded NEPA as creating a
man Wayne Aspinall interpreted the amendment to require agencies to find that the re-
quirements of NEPA prevailed over any existing agency authority to escape compliance.
Senator Jackson's view, reflected in the STATEMENT OF HousE MANAGERS, won out. R.
IROFF, supra note 19, at 29.
25. The CEQ was created by the statute but given no enforcement authority.
Many legislators apparently believed enforcement would fall to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB). OMB, however, never exercised any enforcement authority.
See R. LROFF, supra note 19, at 37-38.
26. The first United States appellate court consideration of NEPA was Zabel v. Tabb,
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), a Fifth Circuit decision upholding the Secretary of the
Army's power to deny a landfill permit for Boca Ciega Bay, Florida, on the basis of
ecological considerations.
27. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
28. The AEC procedures provided for consideration of environmental issues only
when specifically raised by someone outside the Commission, and prohibited independent
consideration of environmental impact by the AEC if other agencies' standards were
satisfied. Id. at 1116-17.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
30. 449 F.2d at 1114-15.
31. Id. at 1115.
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clear judicial mandate to enforce the procedural directives of section
102.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group v. Butz,3 2 recognized that two distinct
standards of review could be applied in NEPA cases.3 3 The Eighth
Circuit stated that federal agency decisions to proceed with projects
after adequate impact statements had been prepared would not be
reversed unless those decisions were arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.3 4
Similarly, the Second Circuit had held that once a federal agency
complies with the procedural mandates of section 102, a court will not
overrule the agency's decision to proceed unless the decision is arbitrary
and capricious.35
When reviewing the threshold decision of whether to prepare an
impact statement, the Eighth Circuit applied not the arbitrariness
standard but a standard of reasonableness. To determine whether an
agency decision is reasonable, a court must closely examine the facts
and circumstances surrounding the decision. The directive in section
102 that the agencies must consider environmental factors "to the
fullest extent possible" requires that a court reviewing the threshold
decision must consider the agency's good faith efforts. The decision
whether to prepare an impact statement, the Eighth Circuit stated, was
not so committed to agency discretion that the courts could not closely
scrutinize the reasoning behind the decision. 36 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit in Cady v. Mortons7 felt that the proper standard should be
that described by the Administrative Procedure Act for agency action
found to be "without observance of procedure required by law."38
The Supreme Court in Kleppe applied neither the reasonableness
32. 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). The controversy in this case involved Forest
Service timber sales in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area of Minnesota.
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970), quoted in part in note 38 inIra.
34. 498 F.2d at 1319.
35. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 467-68 (2d Cir.
1971).
36. 498 F.2d at 1320. See also Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th
Cir. 1973).
37. 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975).
38. 527 F.2d at 793. Title 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) provides in relevant part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(D) without observance of procedure required by law . ...
[Vol. 5
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standard of the Eighth Circuit nor the procedural standard of the
Ninth Circuit. Instead, the agency decision not to prepare a regional
impact study had only to meet the arbitrariness standard.3 9 The
Supreme Court may have restricted courts' authority to delve into the
facts and circumstances surrounding an agency's decision not to pre-
pare an impact statement by stating that it considered the less rigorous
arbitrariness standard appropriate.4 0
Of greater potential impact is the Supreme Court's conclusion
that, regardless of the appropriate standard for review, the time was
not ripe to require the agencies to prepare an impact statement.4'1
NEPA requires an impact statement whenever a federal agency becomes
involved with "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." 4 Much of the NEPA case law has turned
on the meaning of the phrase "major Federal actions."
The issue has been resolved on a case-by-case basis, a major federal
action being determined with reference to specific facts and circum-
stances rather than by application of a general definition.41 Broadly, a
major federal action is one that requires substantial planning, time,
resources, or expenditure. 4 4 For example, agency leasing of sub-
merged federal lands for private operations has been declared a major
federal action which requires an impact statement.45
In People of Enewetak v. Laird,46 the District Court of Hawaii, con-
sidering nuclear weapons testing on Enewetak Island, concluded that
several related federal actions of minor individual impact may have a
39. The applicability of the arbitrariness standard was conceded at oral argument.
427 U.S. 390, 412. In their briefs, the federal agencies stated that federal courts had
unanimously held this to be the appropriate standard. Brief for Petitioners at 47.
40. The arbitrariness standard was previously adopted by the Seventh and Second
Circuits. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229-30 (7th Cir.
1975); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1972).
41. 427 U.S. at 405-06.
42. NEPA § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
43. See, e.g., Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v.
Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (federal aid to construction of
expressway across parkland); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (issuance of a
permit to fill in 11 acres of tideland in Boca Ciega Bay); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971) (construction of the Cross-Florida
Barge Canal).
44. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (federal approval and funding of a watershed project); Citizens Organized to
Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (federal
approval of a mining company permit to cross over an interstate highway).
45. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973). Enewetak is a small Pacific atoll administered
by the- United States. The Enewetakese were removed so that the atoll could be used
as a nuclear testing site. Id. at 813.
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significant collective impact.4" The court's decision turned on a recogni-
tion that, as each individual project progresses, federal investment of
time, money, and other resources increases; and as the commitment of
resources increases, the probability that the actions will be stopped de-
creases despite "environmental considerations."4 8 If a series of minor
actions having a joint impact may require an impact statement, it seems
logical that a series of major actions should also require an impact
statement.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)45 recognized in its
1973 guidelines that federal action, whether major or minor, must not
be viewed in isolation. Rather, the CEQ advised that federal agencies,
in complying with NEPA, should view their actions in terms of cumula-
tive impact. 50 The District of Columbia Circuit relied on these guide-
lines in Scientists' Institute for Public Information [SIPI] v. AEC. 5 1
The SIPI court stated that a single programmatic statement is appropri-
ate when a new program being developed will include several actions.
Therefore, the court required preparation of a cumulative impact state-
ment for the entire national Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Pro-
gram,52 even though the program was still in the planning stages and
individual statements were to be prepared for each proposed facility.
The Congress intended NEPA to make environmental problems a
vital concern in all aspects of federal decisionmaking, including pro-
posals, policy statements, and expansions or revisions of ongoing pro-
grams.53 The SIPI decision reflects a recognition that broad issues con-
cerning an overall program may differ substantially from localized
issues relevant to a single facility.54
47. ld. at 821.
48. Id.; accord, Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v.
Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. Specifically authorized functions of the CEQ include: advising the President;
preparing annual environmental reports; appraising federal compliance with the policy
statement of NEPA § 101; and doing environmental research. Additional CEQ duties
were delineated in Executive Order 11514, 3 C.F.R. 271-72 (1974). CEQ guidelines for
impact statements are not strictly binding on the agencies, but those guidelines have
been highly persuasive for many courts. See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information,
Inc. [SIPI] v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Bd.
v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972). For a good discussion of CEQ's role, see R.
LIROFF, supra note 19, at 36-73.
50. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d)(1) (1976).
51. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
52. A liquid metal fast breeder reactor is a nuclear reactor which uses liquid
sodium as a coolant and as a heat-transfer agent. Id. at 1083.
53. Id. at 1088.
54. Preparation of a programmatic impact statement does not satisfy the requirement
for impact statements on each major action performed as part of the broader program.
Id. at 1085.
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The Ninth Circuit in Cady v. Morton55 followed this logic. Re-
viewing the adequacy of an impact statement covering a single mining
plan within two large tracts leased from an Indian tribe, the court
found "that the environmental consequences of several strip mining
projects extending over twenty years or more within a tract of 30,876.45
acres will be significantly different from those which will accompany...
activities on a single tract of 770 acres."56
The Supreme Court in Kleppe voiced agreement with the SIPI
and Cady premise that comprehensive impact statements are required
"[w]hen several proposals for coal-related actions that will have cumula
tive or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending con-
currently before an agency .... "57 But Kleppe was distinguished from
SIPI and Cady: in SIPI and Cady the agencies involved admitted the
existence of agency projects; in Kleppe the agencies denied that a
project existed. 58 If the Supreme Court had limited its discussion to a
finding that no agency project existed, the Kleppe decision could be
easily restricted to its facts. But the Court emphasized that absent any
project proposal or recommendation, an impact statement was not
required. 9 The suggestion seems to be that, to avoid the impact
statement requirement, federal agencies need only refrain from
designating any study or memorandum as a proposal for a federal
project.
Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA states that a detailed impact statement
shall be included "in every recommendation or report on proposals
for . . .major Federal actions." 60 In Calvert Cliffs', 61 the District of
Columbia Circuit assumed that the impact statement would accompany
a proposal through all stages of agency decisionmaking. The court
emphasized the integration of environmental considerations at an early
stage in order to minimize environmental costs; in fact, the court
felt that NEPA demanded early analysis of environmental factors. 62
In the SIPI case, the District of Columbia Circuit again considered
the issue of the timing of impact statement preparation." The court
recognized that while an impact statement prepared after a proposal
has been developed might be thorough, it would have little impact on
55. 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 795.
57. Brief for Petitioners at 41-42, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
58. 427 U.S. at 410.
59. Id. at 405-06. The Interior Department had focused on regional actions in an
earlier study, but it had made no recommendation for activity on a regional basis.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
61. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C'Cir. 1971).
62. Id. at 1117-18.
63. 481 F.2d at 1093-98.
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agency decisionmaking. Acknowledging that preparation of an impact
statement is also impractical at the initial idea stage, the SIPI court
suggested a four-part test for deciding when to evaluate impact.
Agencies should consider the following factors: 1) the likelihood of
the action's feasibility and how soon it will be found to be feasible;
2) the present availability of meaningful information; 3) the extent to
which irretrievable commitments are being made and options pre-
cluded; and 4) the severity of environmental effects if the action proves
feasible. This test was not designed to abrogate the primary agency
responsibility of deciding when a statement should be prepared.
Rather, the test provided the courts with some method of deciding
whether the time was ripe to require an impact statement.64 Realizing
that environmental factors must be considered early in the decision-
making process, the SIPI court formulated the four-part test to ensure
that the protections offered by NEPA would not be frustrated.6 5
Two years later, however, in Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures [SCRAP II],16
the Supreme Court took a narrower view of NEPA. The Court stated
that section 102(2)(c) required only that an impact statement be pre-
pared at the time an agency makes its formal proposal for action. The
statute, the SCRAP II court stated, refers only to the final impact
statement which is to be included with a recommendation or report
on an agency proposal. Since NEPA does not mention the time at
which impact statements should be begun or at which draft statements
should be prepared, courts can require only that a final statement
accompany formal agency proposals; to the extent that the Calvert
Cliffs' court required more, it conflicted with NEPA.6 7
Following SCRAP 11, the Supreme Court vacated the Second
Circuit's judgment in Coleman v. Conservation Society, Inc.- with
instructions to the lower court to reconsider its 1974 decision in light
of SCRAP II. The Second Circuit then reversed its original decision
that an overall impact statement was required for a 280-mile highway
corridor even though only a 20-mile segment was then being planned.69
Since the Transportation Department had made recommendations re-
64. Id. at 1094.
65. Id. at 1093 & n.60.
66. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
67. Id. at 321 n.20. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, felt that the majority
in SCRAP H ignored the provisions of § 102(2)(A), which require integration of en-
vironmental planning into agency decisionmaking, by requiring an impact study only
when the decisionmaking process was almost complete. Id. at 328-31.
68. 423 U.S. 809 (1975), vacat'g Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508
F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
69. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
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garding only the 20-mile segment, which was solely of local utility, no
programmatic impact statement was deemed necessary. The court
stated that the limited commitment of federal resources which would
occur during construction of the smaller segment would not cause
an irreversible commitment by the agency to further development Of
the entire 280-mile corridor.70
In reversing the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Kleppe,
the Supreme Court relied heavily on SCRAP II. The court of appeals'
decision, however, had not been entirely inconsistent with SCRAP II.
Like the Supreme Court in SCRAP II, the lower court recognized
that every suggestion for agency action could not, in all practicality,
require preparation of an impact statement-some proposals are too
tentative to make an impact statement necessary. The court of appeals
stated that an impact statement must be prepared early enough "that
the agency may have the opportunity to assess the environmental impact
of its plans before committing itself, even tentatively, to action. An
impact statement is designed to aid agency decisionmaking, not provide
an ex post facto justification for it."' Therefore, the lower court
applied the SIPI four-part test to determine whether agency proposals
for the Northern Great Plains had reached a stage at which a statement
was necessary.72 But the Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals'
test; instead it adhered to the strict SCRAP II interpretation of section
102, holding that an impact statement can be required only at the
time an agency recommendation or report on a proposal is made.7 3
By strictly construing the timing requirements of the statute, the
United States Supreme Court in Kleppe further weakened the effective-
ness of NEPA. If the courts must wait for the agencies themselves to
announce a project before section 102 can be judicially enforced,
agencies may effectively delay preparation of an impact statement until
federal resources have been committed. As long as an impact state-
ment exists when a formal recommendation on a proposal is made
and the statement includes the required elements, only arbitrary agency
actions will be reversed by the courts. Even an agency decision not to
70. Some authorities have argued that the Second Circuit reversal of Conservation
Society was not warranted by the SCRAP II decision. E.g., * ENVT'L L. REP. 10081 (1976);
A. Miller, F. Anderson, & R. Liroff, The National Environmental Policy Act and Agency
Policy Making: Neither Paper Tiger Nor Straitjacket, 6 ENVr'L L. REP. 50020 (1976).
71. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d at 879.
72. Id. at 880-81.
73. 427 U.S. at 406. The Supreme Court has granted review of Natural Resources
Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.
1976). 45 U.S.L.W. 3647 (March 29, 1977). In this case, the Second Circuit rejected an
agency's interim leasing program pending completion of an impact statement on wide.
scale environmental effects. 539 F.2d at 845-46.
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prepare a statement cannot be reversed unless the decision is in clear
violation of a very literal construction of NEPA. The courts' role as
watchdog over agency compliance has been diminished.
As pointed out in Justice Marshall's dissent in Kleppe, adequate
impact statements cannot be prepared in a short period of time. 4 The
environmental data essential to a statement must be collected, weighed,
and recorded. A thorough study of environmental impact is no less
time-consuming than thorough consideration of political or economic
impacts. If an environmental impact study is delayed until just before
the agency plans to make a report on a project proposal, a hurried
study of environmental impact is likely. Yet the Kleppe court indicates
that earlier environmental study cannot be required. NEPA was in-
tended to integrate efficacious environmental consideration into agency
decisionmaking. Rushed collection of data and analysis of environ-
mental factors, after analysis of other factors is almost complete, does
not effect this objective.
In addition, once agency time and money have been expended in
preparing a proposal, implementation of the proposal will be delayed
if the agency then has to stop and make an environmental analysis.
Efficiency requires that all pertinent factors, including environmental
factors, be considered simultaneously. Such a process would enable an
agency to balance all factors against one another. This would minimize
the risk that a proposal would be halted-due to unforeseen environ-
mental factors-after the decisionmaking process is almost complete.
If all factors are considered from the very early stages of decision-
making, agencies would more likely give environmental factors an
equivalent consideration.7 5
This assessment of Kleppe's impact may be overly pessimistic. The
arbitrariness standard will mean that NEPA cannot be completely
disregarded. Also, it is possible that the Court viewed coal mine leasing
as an activity which could be conducted on a lease-by-lease basis,
without any preexisting, comprehensive, agency program.76  The
74. 427 U.S. at 415. Justice Marshall noted that if a regional impact statement were to
be prepared for the Northern Great Plains coal mining operations, the preparation
would take at least three years.
75. See A. Miller, F. Anderson, & R. Liroff, supra note 70.
76. Cf. 427 U.S. at 414-15 & n.26. The Court suggests that, though other leases are
pending for the same region, a single mining lease may be approved before a compre-
hensive regional leasing program is proposed or the cumulative environmental impact
studies evaluated. An agency need not consider cumulative impacts until a second lease
is actually approved. Possibly only the cumulative impact of those two leases need be
considered. If agencies are allowed to evaluate cumulative regional impact in, such a
piecemeal fashion, a complete regional impact statement might not be prepared until
the final lease is approved. At some point an agency would become committed to the
approval of subsequent leases, Without a clear idea of probable regional impact before
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existence of a national coal-leasing impact statement, as well as in-
dividual statements for several leases within the Northern Great Plains
region, may have convinced the Court that this situation did not
warrant a regional impact statement. Under another set of circum-
stances, the Court may feel that an agency's actions so suggest the
existence of a proposal for action that the Court will require com-
pliance with section 102 before the agency itself announces the
proposal.
The Kleppe decision offered some support for advocates of regional
impact statements. The Supreme Court recognized that some coal-
leasing activities could be so interconnected that the cumulative impact
would require a joint impact statement.7 7 Although the court referred
specifically to coal-related actions, the same requirement should be
applicable to other types of proposals as well. Furthermore, the court
acknowledged that the cumulative impact of several projects may
differ, in degree and character, from the sum of their individual impacts.
Recognition by the courts of the interrelationships between actions
taken in a single geographic area should encourage agencies to give
close consideration to cumulative impact. Court recognition of regional
impact also affords the public a basis for challenging agency decisions
made without consideration of such impact. Admittedly, Kleppe leaves
the environmental advocate the heavy burden of proving agency
arbitrariness. The Kleppe opinion suggests, however, that in some situa-
tions agency decisions not to prepare a regional impact statement may
be arbitrary. If the burden of proof is met, agency action at the
independent project level may be stopped pending determination of
cumulative impact.
In effect, Kleppe diminishes the courts' role in enforcing NEPA
but does leave some basis on which subsequent NEPA challenges may
be made. While a federal court may no longer scrutinize the reasonable-
ness of agency decisions, it may consider whether agency actions within
a single region are so interrelated as to make consideration of cumula-
tive impact judicially enforceable. The Supreme Court gives no clear
indication, however, of the factors which will be considered in deter-
mining whether a regional impact statement is required. Delineation
of these factors has been left for subsequent litigation.
MARTHA L. HARRELL
the first lease is approved, therefore, the point of commitment may be passed long
before a cumulative regional impact study is madq,
77. 427 U.S. at 410.
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